Sino-Soviet split

Cold War schism between communist states

Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev in 1958

The Sino-Soviet split (1956–1966) was the breaking of political relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), caused by doctrinal divergences that arose from their different interpretations and practical applications of Marxism–Leninism, as influenced by their respective geopolitics during the Cold War.^[1] In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Sino-Soviet debates about the interpretation of Orthodox Marxism became specific disputes about the Soviet Union's policies of national de-Stalinization and international peaceful coexistence with the Western world. Against that political background, the international relations of the PRC featured official belligerence towards the West, and an initial, public rejection of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence between the Eastern and Western blocs, which Mao Zedong said was Marxist revisionism by the Russian communists.^[1]

Beginning in 1956, after Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin and Stalinism in the speech On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences (25 February 1956), the PRC and the USSR had progressively divergent interpretations of Marxist ideology; by 1961, their intractable differences of ideologic interpretation and praxis provoked the PRC's formal denunciation of Soviet communism as the work of "revisionist traitors" in the USSR.^[1] Among the Eastern Bloc countries, the Sino-Soviet split was about who would lead the revolution for world communism, China or Russia, and to whom would the vanguard parties of the world turn for political advice, financial aid, and military assistance.^[2] In that vein, the USSR and the PRC competed for ideological leadership through the communist parties native to the countries in their spheres of influence.^[3]

In the Western world, the Sino-Soviet split transformed the geopolitics of the bi-polar cold war into a tri-polar cold war, and facilitated Sino-American rapprochement and U.S. President Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to China. Ontologically, the Sino-Soviet split voided the political perception that "monolithic communism" was a unitary actor in geopolitics, especially during the 1947–1950 period in Vietnam, which led to U.S. military invasion.^[4] Historically, the ideological Sino-Soviet split facilitated the Marxist–Leninist Realpolitik by which Mao established the tri-polar geopolitics (PRC–USA–USSR) of the late-period Cold War.^[5]

Contents

• 
  1 Origins
  
  
  
  • 
    1.1 Reluctant co-belligerents
    
  
  
  • 
    1.2 Chinese communist revolution
    
  
  
  • 
    1.3 1950 Treaty of friendship
    
  
  
  • 
    1.4 Relations repaired
    
  
  
  • 
    1.5 Discontents of de-Stalinization
    
  
  
  • 
    1.6 Conflicting national interests
    
  
  
  • 
    1.7 Two Chinas
    
  
  
  
  


• 
  2 Onset
  
  
  
  • 
    2.1 The Balkans and the United States
    
  
  
  • 
    2.2 Personal attacks
    
  
  
  • 
    2.3 Monolithic communism fractured
    
  
  
  • 
    2.4 Formal statements
    
  
  
  
  


• 
  3 Conflict
  
  
  
  • 
    3.1 Cultural Revolution
    
  
  
  • 
    3.2 Low-level warfare
    
  
  
  • 
    3.3 Nuclear China
    
  
  
  • 
    3.4 Geopolitical pragmatism
    
  
  
  • 
    3.5 Competing front groups
    
  
  
  
  


• 
  4 Detente
  
  
  
  • 
    4.1 The transition and Deng Xiaoping
    
  
  
  • 
    4.2 Conflicting hegemonies
    
  
  
  • 
    4.3 Reform
    
  
  
  
  


• 
  5 See also
  


• 
  6 Footnotes
  


• 
  7 Further reading
  
  
  
  • 
    7.1 Primary sources
    
  
  
  
  


• 
  8 External links
  

Origins

Reluctant co-belligerents

Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong

In the course of the World War II, the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the nationalist Kuomintang party (KMT) set aside their civil war in order to fight, defeat, and expel Imperial Japan from China. To that end, Joseph Stalin ordered Mao Zedong, leader of the CPC, to co-operate with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the KMT, in fighting the Second Sino-Japanese War. Following the surrender of Japan, the CPC and KMT resumed their civil war, from which the CPC emerged victorious.^[6]

At war's end, Stalin advised Mao to not seize political power at that time, and, instead, to collaborate with Chiang due to the USSR–KMT Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (1945); in communist solidarity, Mao abided Stalin.^[7] However, when Chiang opposed the annexation of Tannu Uriankhai (Mongolia) to the USSR three months after the Japanese surrender, Stalin broke the treaty requiring the Red Army's withdrawal from Manchuria (giving Mao control of the region) and ordered General Rodion Malinovsky to give to the Chinese communists the spoils of war captured from the Imperial Japanese Army.^[8]

In the post-war 1945–1950 period, the United States had fully financed the KMT, Chiang, his nationalist political party, and the National Revolutionary Army, his armed forces in the civil war; and despite having lost the war to the communists, the U.S. sent General George Marshall to broker peace between the communist and anti-communist belligerents; Mao was willing to compromise and co-operate with Chiang, who refused to compromise and co-operate with the communists. In the concluding period of the civil war, the Chinese Communist Revolution expelled the KMT from China, who then fled to Formosa island, where they established the U.S.-sponsored Republic of China in 1950, better known as Taiwan.^[9]

Chinese communist revolution

PRC leader Mao Zedong and the journalist Anna Louise Strong in 1967

A PRC postage stamp commemorating the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (1950)

As a theoretician of communism seeking to realise a socialist state in China, Mao developed and adapted the urban ideology of Orthodox Marxism for practical application to the conditions of pre-industrial China and the Chinese people. Mao's Sinification of Marxism established political pragmatism as the first priority for realising the accelerated modernisation of a country and a people; and ideological orthodoxy as the secondary priority to that goal, because Orthodox Marxism originated for practical application to the conditions of the industrialised countries of western Europe.^[10]

In 1947, whilst fighting the Chinese Civil War against the KMT nationalists, Mao dispatched a U.S. journalist Anna Louise Strong to the West, bearing political documents explaining China's socialist future, and that she "show them to Party leaders in the United States and Europe" for their better understanding of the Chinese Communist Revolution, but that it was not "necessary to take them to Moscow". Mao trusted Strong because of her positive reportage about him, in the article "The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung", and about the CPC's communist revolution, in the book Dawn Comes Up Like Thunder Out of China: An Intimate Account of the Liberated Areas in China (1948), which reports that the intellectual feat of Mao Zedong was “to change Marxism from a European [form] to an Asiatic form ... in ways of which neither Marx nor Lenin could dream".

1950 Treaty of friendship

Main article: Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship

Mao made a prolonged visit to Moscow in 1949–1950. He had infrequent meetings with Stalin – who was charming – and difficult meetings with lesser officials. Stalin promised large-scale military, economic and technological aid, as well has a line of credit and a low interest loan. Nevertheless, Mao felt humiliated on his protracted visit. Finally on February 14, 1950, Mao and Stalin signed a 30-year Treaty of Friendship, and Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Stalin promised help if China was attacked by Japan. The Treaty transferred control of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria to China – without compensation, as well as Port Arthur and Darien, the last two ports were finally returned after Stalin's death. China had to recognize the independence of the Mongolia, a Soviet satellite. On the whole the treaty was favorable to China, but it clearly marked that country was inferior to the USSR. On the other hand, unlike Soviet satellite states, Moscow did not control any decisions-making in Beijing. Within a decade, the Treaty was worthless, ignored by both sides as tensions escalated.^[11][12]

Ignoring the warnings of Soviet advisors, Mao imposed a massive Great Leap Forward to transform agrarian China into an industrialized country. It was very poorly planned and operationalized, and the Leap proved disastrous. Urgently needed resources were removed from the agricultural sector and poured into factories and mills that produced very little output. False claims and exaggerated reports covered up the sharp decline in food output, leading to a famine that killed tens of millions.^[13]

Relations repaired

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Following the death of Stalin in 1953, the new Premier of the USSR Nikita Khrushchev improved relations with trade agreements, formal acknowledgement of Stalin's economic unfairness to China, 15 industrial-development projects, and exchanges of technicians (ca. 10,000) and political advisors (ca. 1,500), whilst China sent manual labourers to fill shortages of workers in Siberia. Despite such economic relations, Mao and Khrushchev disliked each other personally and ideologically.^[14] In 1954, as members of the Eastern Bloc, both countries collaborated in peace-treaty rapprochement between Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Republic of Vietnam. Consequent to Khrushchev's having repaired relations with Mao and the Chinese, by 1955, 60% of the PRC's exports went to the Soviet Union, by way of the Five-year plans of China that began in 1953.^[15]

Discontents of de-Stalinization

In early 1956, relations began deteriorating consequent to Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization, which he initiated with the speech On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences that criticised Stalin and Stalinism, especially the Great Purge, the rank-and-file of the armed forces, and the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). In light of de-Stalinization, the CPSU's changed ideological orientation — from Stalin's confrontation of the West to Khrushchev's coexistence with the West — posed serious problems of ideological credibility and political authority for Mao, who had emulated Stalin's style of leadership and practical application of Marxism–Leninism in the development of Chinese Communism and the PRC.^[16]

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 against the rule of Moscow was a serious political concern for Mao, because it had required military intervention to suppress, and its occurrence denied the political legitimacy of the communist party to be in government. In response to that discontent among the European members of the Eastern Bloc, the CPC denounced the USSR's de-Stalinization as Marxist revisionism, and reaffirmed the Stalinist ideology, policies, and practices of Mao's government as the correct course for achieving socialism in China. In the event, such Sino-Soviet divergences of Marxist–Leninist praxis and interpretation began fracturing monolithic communism — the Western misperception of absolute ideological unity in the Eastern Bloc.^[17]

From Mao's perspective, the success of the Soviet foreign policy of peaceful coexistence with the West would geopolitically isolate the PRC;^[18] whilst the Hungarian Revolution indicated the possibility of anti-communist revolt in the PRC, and in China's sphere of influence. To thwart such discontent, Mao launched the Hundred Flowers Campaign of political liberalization – the freedom of speech to publicly criticize government, the bureaucracy, and the CPC; but the campaign proved too-successful when it featured blunt criticism of Mao as the Chinese head-of-state and as the chairman of the communist party.^[19] Consequent to the relative freedoms of the de-Stalinized Soviet Union, Mao retained the Stalinist model of Marxist–Leninist economy, government, and society for China.^[20]

Conflicting national interests

The strait of Taiwan

In July 1958, in Beijing, Khrushchev and Mao were negotiating joint Sino-Soviet naval bases in China, from which nuclear-armed Soviet submarines would deter U.S. intervention to that region. The agreement failed when Mao accused Khrushchev of trying to establish Soviet control of the PRC's coast.^[21] In late August, Mao sought the PRC's sovereignty upon Taiwan by attacking the Kinmen and Matsu Islands, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.

In launching that regional war, Mao did not inform Khrushchev. Formal, ideological response to such a geopolitical contingency compelled Khrushchev's revision of the USSR's policy of peaceful coexistence to include regional wars, like the second crisis with Taiwan. Mao's withholding of information from Khrushchev worsened their personal and political relations, especially because the U.S. threatened nuclear war upon China and the USSR, if the former invaded Taiwan; thus did Mao's continual shoot-outs with Chiang impel Khrushchev into Sino-American quarrels about a long-lost civil war.^[22] In context of the tri-polar Cold War, Khrushchev doubted the mental sanity of Mao due to his unrealistic policies of geopolitical confrontation might provoke nuclear war between the capitalist and the communist blocs. To thwart Mao's warmongering, Khrushchev cancelled foreign-aid agreements and the delivery of Soviet atomic bombs to the PRC.^[23]

Two Chinas

Throughout the 1950s, Khrushchev maintained positive Sino-Soviet relations with foreign aid (especially Soviet technology for China's atomic bomb) but the political tensions perdured, because the economic benefits of the USSR's peaceful-coexistence policy voided the belligerent PRC's geopolitical credibility among the nations under Chinese hegemony, especially after a failed Sino-American rapprochement. In China's sphere of influence, that Sino-American diplomatic failure and the presence of U.S. atomic bombs in Taiwan justified Mao's confrontational foreign policies, including the Second Strait Crisis with Taiwan, whom the U.S. officially recognized as the legitimate government of China.^[24]

In late 1958, the CPC revived Mao's cult of personality to portray him as the charismatic, omniscient leader solely qualified to control the policy, the administration, and the popular mobilisation required to realise the Great Leap Forward to industrialize China.^[25] Moreover, to the Eastern bloc, Mao portrayed the PRC's warfare with Taiwan and the Great Leap Forward as Stalinist examples of Marxism–Leninism adapted to China's conditions. These circumstances allowed ideological Sino-Soviet competition, and Mao publicly criticized Khrushchev's economic and foreign policies as deviations from Marxism–Leninism. Nonetheless, to the pragmatic Khrushchev, the PRC's Stalinist worldview remained the destabilising threat to peaceful coexistence in the tri-polar Cold War, and to protect East–West rapprochement, Khrushchev undermined Mao's belligerence by reducing the USSR's foreign aid to the PRC.^[26]

Onset

To Mao Zedong, the events of the 1958–1959 period indicated that Nikita Khrushchev was politically untrustworthy as an orthodox Marxist.^[27] In 1959, Khrushchev met with U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to decrease geopolitical tensions with the U.S. To that end, the USSR reneged an agreement for technical aid to develop China's atomic bomb, and sided with India in the Sino-Indian War. Each S.S.-Soviet collaboration offended Mao's sensibilities as a Marxist–Leninist and thereafter, he perceived Khrushchev as a Marxist who had become too tolerant of the West, despite the USSR sometimes confronting the West, such as the Berlin Blockade. The Communist Party of China (CPC) believed that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) concentrated too much on "Soviet–U.S. co-operation for the domination of the world", with geopolitical actions that contradicted Marxism–Leninism.^[28]

The Balkans and the United States

The Sino-Soviet split began with Khrushchev insulting Mao's Chinese Communism.

Stalinist solidarity: Mao Zedong of the PRC and Enver Hoxha of Socialist Albania

In the 1950s, the split was manifested in public denunciation and criticism of the allied countries of China and the USSR. The PRC denounced Yugoslavia as not being socialist for having a mixed economy, and attacked Josip Broz Tito as an ideological deviationist for pursuing a politically non-aligned foreign policy that was separate and apart from the geopolitics of the USSR and the PRC, whilst remaining in the Eastern Bloc. The USSR criticized Albania as a politically-backward socialist state, and its leader Enver Hoxha, for retaining Stalinism and for allying with the PRC, from which followed the Soviet–Albanian split. Moreover, to further thwart the Chinese communists, the USSR publicly gave moral support to the anti-PRC rebels during the Tibetan uprising.

In 1960, Mao expected Khrushchev to aggressively deal with Eisenhower, by holding him accountable for the USSR having shot down a U-2 spy plane that was photographing Soviet military bases for the CIA; aerial espionage that the U.S. said had been discontinued. At the Four Powers Summit meeting in Paris, Khrushchev demanded, but did not receive from Eisenhower an official U.S. apology for the CIA's continuing aerial espionage of the USSR. Mao and the CPC interpreted Eisenhower's refusal to apologize as disrespectful of national sovereignty (aerial and terrestrial) of socialist countries, and held political rallies aggressively demanding Khrushchev's military confrontation with the U.S. aggressors; without such decisive action, as a communist national-leader Khrushchev lost face with the PRC. In Romania, at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties, Mao and Khrushchev respectively attacked the Soviet and the Chinese interpretations of Orthodox Marxism and Leninism as the wrong road to world socialism in each other's countries. Mao said that Khrushchev's emphasis on consumer goods and material plenty would make the Soviet people ideologically soft and un-revolutionary. Khrushchev responded that: “If we could promise the people nothing, except revolution, they would scratch their heads and say: ‘Isn’t it better to have good goulash?"^[29]

Personal attacks

Sino-Soviet split
Chinese name
Traditional Chinese	中蘇交惡
Simplified Chinese	中苏交恶
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin Zhōngsū jiāowù
Russian name
Russian	Советско–китайский раскол
Romanization	Sovetsko–kitayskiy raskol

In the 1960s, the split featured public displays of acrimonious intramural quarrels between Stalinist Chinese and anti-Stalinist Russian communists. At the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) Congress, the CPC's Peng Zhen quarrelled with Khrushchev, after the latter had insulted Mao as a Chinese nationalist, a geopolitical adventurist, and an ideological deviationist from Orthodox Marxism.^[when?] In turn, Peng insulted Khrushchev as a Marxist revisionist whose political regime as premier of the USSR showed him to be a "patriarchal, arbitrary, and tyrannical" ruler.^[30][when?] In the event, Khrushchev denounced the PRC with 80 pages of critical complaints to the congress of the PCR. In June 1960, at the zenith of de-Stalinization, the USSR denounced Albania as a politically backward country for retaining Stalinism as government and model of socialism. In turn, Bao Sansan said that the CPC's message to the cadres in China was: “When Khrushchev stopped Russian aid to Albania, Hoxha said to his people: ‘Even if we have to eat the roots of grass to live, we won’t take anything from Russia.’ China is not guilty of chauvinism, and immediately sent food to our brother country.”^[31]

In response to the insults, Khrushchev withdrew 1,400 Soviet technicians from the PRC, which cancelled some 200 joint-scientific-projects meant to foster Sino-Soviet amity and co-operation between socialist nations. In response, Mao justified his belief that Khrushchev had, somehow, caused China's great economic failures, and the famines occurred in the period of the Great Leap Forward; nonetheless, the PRC and the USSR remained pragmatic allies, which allowed Mao to alleviate famine in China and to resolve Sino-Indian border disputes. To Mao, Khrushchev had lost a measure of political authority and ideological credibility, because his U.S.-Soviet policy of geopolitical détente resulted in successful military (aerial) espionage against the USSR, and public confrontation with an unapologetic capitalist enemy. That miscalculation of person and circumstance voided diplomacy between the U.S. and the USSR at the Four Powers Summit.^[32]

Monolithic communism fractured

In late 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis concluded when the U.S. and the USSR respectively agreed to remove intermediate-range PGM-19 Jupiter nuclear missiles (pictured) from Italy and Turkey, and to remove intermediate-range R-12 Dvina and R-14 Chusovaya nuclear missiles from Cuba. In the context of the Sino-Soviet split, Mao said that the USSR's military stand-down was Khrushchev's betrayal of Marxist–Leninist geopolitics.

In 1961, at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the PRC and the USSR revisited their doctrinal disputes about the orthodox interpretation and practical application of Marxism–Leninism.^[33] In December 1961, the USSR broke diplomatic relations with Albania, which escalated the Sino-Soviet disputes from the political-party-level to the national-government-level. In that vein, the USSR publicly approved of India's annexation of Goa, a former Portuguese territoty. The PRC publicly played down the event by saying that: "India's apparent contribution to anti-imperialist struggle consists of taking on the world's smallest imperialist power."

In late 1962, the PRC broke relations with the USSR, because Khrushchev did not go to war with the U.S. over the Cuban Missile Crisis. Regarding that Soviet loss-of-face, Mao said that "Khrushchev has moved from adventurism to capitulationism" with a negotiated, bilateral military stand-down. Khrushchev replied that Mao's belligerent foreign policies would lead to an East–West nuclear war.^[34] In the West, the Cuban Missile Crisis made nuclear disarmament the political priority of the Cold War. The U.S., the UK, and the USSR agreed to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on 5 August 1963 that formally forbade nuclear-detonation tests in the Earth's atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, yet did allow underground nuclear-detonation tests. During this time, the PRC's nuclear weapons program was nascent, and Mao perceived the treaty as the nuclear powers' attempt to thwart China from becoming a nuclear superpower.^[35]

As a Marxist–Leninist, Mao was much angered that Khrushchev did not militarily confront the U.S. over their failed Bay of Pigs Invasion and their continual interference with Cuba's internal politics such as economic embargo, agricultural sabotage and aerial espionage. For the Eastern Bloc, Mao addressed these matters in "Nine Letters" critical of Khrushchev and his leadership of the USSR. Moreover, the break with the USSR allowed Mao to reorient the development of China with formal relations (diplomatic, economic, political) with the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.^[36]

Formal statements

The split allowed only written communications between the PRC and the USSR. Both supported their geopolitical actions with formal statements of ideology concerning the true road to world communism, which is the general line of the party. In June 1963, the PRC published The Chinese Communist Party's Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement,^[37] to which the USSR replied with the Open Letter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.^[38] In 1964, Mao said that in light of their differences of interpretation of Orthodox Marxism, a counter-revolution in the USSR had re-established capitalism; consequently the USSR and then the Warsaw Pact countries broke relations with the PRC.

In late 1964, China's Premier Zhou Enlai went to the USSR, and met Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin, the new leaders of the USSR. Their meeting went poorly, and the disappointed Zhou returned to China and reported to Mao that the Soviets remained in the ideological stance that Mao denounced as "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev". Mao's dismissal of Soviet conditions continued the Sino-Soviet split. The PRC accused the USSR of colluding with the U.S. at the Glassboro Summit Conference between Kosygin and U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson. The propaganda interpretation of the summit published by Radio Peking reported that the Soviet and American politicians discussed "a great conspiracy, on a worldwide basis . . . criminally selling the rights of the revolution of [the] Vietnam people, Arabs, as well as Asian, African, and Latin-American peoples, to U.S. imperialists".^[39]

Conflict

Cultural Revolution

In 1966, Mao Zedong launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to counter the Soviet-style bureaucracies of personal-power-centres established in education, agriculture, and industrial management. Abiding Mao's proclamations for universal ideological orthodoxy, schools and universities closed throughout China when students organised themselves into politically radical Red Guards. Lacking a leader, political purpose, and social function, the ideologically discrete units of Red Guards soon degenerated into political factions, each of whom claimed to be ideologically truer to the socialist philosophy of Mao than were the other factions.^[40] In establishing the universal orthodoxy of ideology presented in the Little Red Book (Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung), the political violence of the Red Guards provoked civil war in parts of China, which Mao suppressed with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) imprisoning the fractious Red Guards. Moreover, when Red Guard factionalism occurred in the PLA, Mao's power-base, he dissolved the Red Guards, and then reconstituted the CPC with the Maoist comrades who had perdured through and survived the Cultural Revolution that purged anti-communist elements from China and the Party.^[41] Mao required internal political equilibrium in order to protect China from the strategic and military vulnerabilities that resulted from its political isolation from the international community.

As social engineering, the Cultural Revolution reasserted the political primacy of the Maoism, but also stressed, strained, and broke the PRC's relations with the USSR and with the West.^[42] Geopolitically, despite their querulous "Maoism vs. Marxism–Leninism" disputes about interpretations and practical applications of Orthodox Marxism, the USSR and the PRC advised, aided, and supplied North Vietnam during the Vietnam War (1945–1975),^[43] which Maoism defined as a peasant revolution against foreign imperialism. In socialist solidarity, the PRC allowed safe passage for the Soviet Union's matériel to North Vietnam to prosecute the war against the US-sponsored South Vietnam.^[44]

Low-level warfare

Main article: Sino-Soviet border conflict

The Sino-Soviet split allowed minor border disputes to escalate to firefights for areas of the Argun and Amur rivers (Damansky–Zhenbao is southeast, north of the lake (2 March – 11 September 1969).

The door to the anti-bomb shelter in the tunnels of Underground Project 131, in Hubei, China

Since 1956, the split, between communist political parties, had escalated to small-scale warfare between the USSR and China. In January 1967, the Red Guards attacked the Soviet embassy in Beijing. In the previous year, China had revived the matter of the Russo-Chinese border that was demarcated in the 19th century, and imposed upon the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) monarchy by means of unequal treaties that virtually annexed Chinese territory to the Russian Empire.

Despite not asking the return of territory, China did ask the USSR to formally and publicly acknowledge that said border, established with the 1858 Treaty of Aigun and the 1860 Convention of Peking, was a historic Russian injustice against China. The Soviet government ignored the matter. Meanwhile, during 1968, the Soviet Army had massed along the 4,380-kilometre (2,720 mi) border with China – especially at the Xinjiang frontier, in northwest China, where the Soviets might readily induce a Turkic separatist insurrection. In 1961, the USSR had 12 divisions of soldiers and 200 airplanes at that border. By 1968, there were 25 divisions, 1,200 airplanes, and 120 medium-range missiles; by March 1969, the border confrontations had become the Sino-Soviet border conflict, with fighting at the Ussuri River and on Damansky–Zhenbao Island; more small-scale warfare occurred at Tielieketi in August.

Nuclear China

In the 1960–64 period, U.S. presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson had considered destroying the Chinese nuclear weapons program before fruition, but the USSR had refused to co-operate in a unilateral first-strike nuclear war.^[45] In 1969, the U.S. warned the USSR that a unilateral first-strike nuclear attack against the PRC would provoke World War III.^[46] Aware of the Soviet nuclear threat, the PRC built large-scale underground shelters, such as the Underground City in Beijing, and military bomb shelters, such as the Underground Project 131 command center in Hubei, and the 816 Nuclear Military Plant, in the Fuling District of Chongqing city.

Geopolitical pragmatism

To counter the USSR, Mao met U.S President Richard Nixon in order to establish a Sino-American rapprochement. (China, 1972)

After the Sino-Soviet border conflict, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin secretly went to Beijing to confer with Premier Zhou Enlai, and by October, both countries began determining the demarcation of their national borders. Despite not resolving the border demarcation, the meetings restored Sino-Soviet diplomatic communications, and, by 1970, Mao understood that the PRC could not simultaneously fight both the USSR and the USA, whilst suppressing internal disorder. In July 1971, U.S. President Richard Nixon's National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, went to Beijing to arrange the president's visit to China. Kissinger's actions offended the USSR, who then convoked a summit meeting with Nixon. That action re-cast the Cold War as tri-polar relation among Moscow, Washington and Beijing.

Concerning the 4,380 kilometres (2,720 mi) Sino-Soviet border, Soviet propaganda agitated against the PRC's complaint about the unequal Treaty of Aigun and the Convention of Peking, which cheated China of territory and natural resources. To that effect, in the 1972–1973 period, the USSR deleted the Chinese and Manchu place-names—Iman (伊曼, Yiman), Tetyukhe (野猪河, yĕzhūhé), and Suchan—from the map of the Russian Far East, and replaced them with the Russian place-names Dalnerechensk, Dalnegorsk, and Partizansk, respectively.^[47][48] To facilitate social acceptance of such cultural revision, the Soviet press misrepresented the historical presence of Chinese people—in lands gained by Tsarist Russia—which provoked Russian violence against the local Chinese; moreover, politically inconvenient exhibits were removed from museums,^[47] and vandals covered with cement the Jurchen-script stele, about the Jin Dynasty, in the Khabarovsk Museum.^[49]

Competing front groups

Further information: Communist front

The communist bloc in 1980: pro-Soviet (red), pro–Chinese (yellow), the non-aligned (black) North Korea and Yugoslavia.

After breaking relations with the USSR, Mao and Khrushchev entered into a Sino-Soviet rivalry to be the leader of world communism.^[50] In the countries within China's sphere of influence, Mao established a network of pro-Chinese political-front organisations that challenged pro-Soviet organisations in orienting local communists to the PRC's variety of communist revolution.^[51][52]

By 1970, Sino-Soviet rivalry had extended to Africa and the Middle East, where both countries funded opposing political parties, militias, and states, notably in the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Rhodesian Bush War between white colonists and anti-colonial natives and the Bush War's aftermath, the Zimbabwean Gukurahundi massacres, the Angolan Civil War between competing liberation movements was a Soviet-American proxy war, the Mozambican Civil War, and Palestinian guerrilla factions. In Thailand, the pro-Chinese front organisations were based upon the local Chinese minority population, and thus were politically ineffective.^[53]

Detente

The transition and Deng Xiaoping

The elimination of Marshal Lin Biao in 1971 ameliorated the Cultural Revolution.

In 1971, the politically-radical phase of the Cultural Revolution concluded with the failure of Project 571, a coup d'état to depose Mao Zedong, and the death of Marshal Lin Biao, Mao's executive officer. Afterwards, China resumed political normalcy, until the death of Mao on 9 September 1976, and the emergence of the politically radical Gang of Four. The re-establishment of Chinese domestic tranquility ended armed confrontation with the USSR, but it did not improve diplomatic relations, because in 1973, the Soviet Army garrisons at the Russo-Chinese border were twice as large as the ones in 1969. The continued military threat prompted the PRC to denounce "Soviet social imperialism", by accusing the USSR of being an enemy of world revolution.

After thwarting the 1976 coup d'état by the Gang of Four, who argued for ideologic orthodoxy at the expense of internal development, the CPC politically rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping and appointed him head of the internal modernization programs in 1977. With the reversal of Mao's policies (without politically attacking him), the politically moderate Deng's political and economic reforms began the PRC's transition from a fully planned economy to a socialist market economy, which he furthered with strengthened commercial and diplomatic relations with the West.^[54][55] In 1979, on the 30th anniversary of the foundation of the PRC, Deng's government denounced the Cultural Revolution as a national failure, and in the 1980s, pursued Realpolitik policies, such as "seeking truth from facts" and the "Chinese road to socialism", which withdrew the PRC from the high-level abstractions of ideology, polemic, and the Marxist revisionism of the Soviet Union. As a result, the split had lost some political importance.^[54][55]

Conflicting hegemonies

After the death of Mao, the ideological Sino-Soviet split became domestic politics, but remained useful geopolitics when the national interests of the Soviet and Chinese hegemonies conflicted. The initial Sino-Soviet proxy war occurred in 1975, when the military victory of North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War produced a post-colonial southeast Asia that featured socialist countries, such as Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and Democratic Kampuchea.

In 1979, the Vietnamese deposed the government of Pol Pot in Kampuchea, during the Cambodian–Vietnamese War.

Vietnam initially ignored the Khmer Rouge domestic re-organisation of Cambodia by Pol Pot as an internal matter, until it attacked the ethnic Vietnamese people in Cambodia, and the border with Vietnam. The counter-attack precipitated the Cambodian–Vietnamese War which deposed Pol Pot in 1978. In response, the PRC denounced Vietnam and retaliated by invading northern Vietnam in 1979, a move which the USSR denounced.

Diplomatic relations between China and Afghanistan were neutral during the reign of Mohammed Zahir Shah. When pro-Soviet Afghan communists seized power in 1978, relations quickly worsened and became hostile. In December 1979, the USSR invaded Afghanistan to maintain the communist government in power. The PRC viewed it as a local feint, within Soviet's greater, geopolitical encirclement of China. Although the Afghan communists supported China's enemies in Vietnam, and blamed China for supporting militant Afghan anti-Communists, China responded to the Soviet invasion by supporting the Afghan Mujahidin with aid, small arms, and matériel, delivered by the Pakistani military and intelligence and the CIA, and likewise increased their military presence in Xinjiang, near Afghanistan. The PRC subsequently entered a tri-partite alliance with the U.S. and Pakistan to sponsor an Islamist Afghan armed resistance to the Soviet occupation (cf. Operation Storm-333), and acquired U.S. military equipment to defend from a possible Soviet attack.^[56] China utilized the People's Liberation Army to train and support the Mujahidin. This included moving training camps from Pakistan into China proper, which were supported with military advisors and soldiers; afterwards, the Mujahidin were provided with anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers, and machine guns.^[57]

Meanwhile, the Sino-Soviet split became manifest when Deng Xiaoping, who had become the paramount leader of China, required the removal of "three obstacles" so that Sino-Soviet relations might improve: The massed Soviet Army at the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia, Soviet support of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea (Cambodia) and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

In 1981–82, Sino-American relations were strained by geopolitical disagreements over wars such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the Falklands War. At the CCP's 12th Congress in September 1982, Deng Xiaoping revived the revisionist "Three Worlds" idea that characterized China as a neutral player in a world divided by conflict between the superpowers. Meanwhile, in March 1982 in Tashkent, Soviet Secretary Brezhnev gave a speech that was conciliatory towards the PRC, and Deng took advantage of Brezhnev's proffered conciliation. In autumn of 1982, Sino-Soviet relations resumed (semi-annually) at the vice-ministerial level. When Brezhnev died in November 1982, a Chinese delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Huang Hua, attended the funeral, where he praised Brezhnev as "an outstanding champion of world peace" and expressed hope for normal relations with Moscow. However, Huang's actions at Brezhnev's funeral led to his dismissal from office after he returned to the PRC.

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He worked to restore political relations with the PRC, and reduced the Soviet Army garrisons at the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia, resumed trade, and dropped the matter of the 1969 border-demarcation dispute. Nonetheless, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan remained unresolved, and Sino-Soviet diplomacy remained cool, which circumstance allowed U.S. President Ronald Reagan's aadministration to sell U.S. weapons to China and to counter the USSR in the U.S.-Soviet aspect of the tri-polar Cold War. Throughout the 1980s, Sino-Soviet political relations improved, by trade agreements and cultural exchanges, however ideological relations between the communist parties of the USSR and China remained unchanged, because the latter refused to accept the former as their Marxist equals.

Reform

Paramount Leader of China, Deng Xiaoping (center), with U.S. President Gerald Ford (left), China, 1975

In May 1989, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev visited China, where the government doubted the practical efficacy of perestroika and glasnost. Since China did not officially recognize the USSR as a socialist state, there was no official opinion about Gorbachev's reforms. Privately, the Chinese communists thought that the USSR was unprepared for such political and social reforms without first reforming the economy. The Chinese perspective derived from how Deng Xiaoping effected economic reform with a semi-capitalist mixed economy, while the political power remained with the Communist Party. Ultimately, Gorbachev's reforms resulted in the banning of Soviet Communist Party and was among the many factors that caused the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

See also

• 
  China portal
  


• 
  Soviet Union portal
  


• 
  Russia portal
  


• 
  International relations portal
  

• History of the Soviet Union (1953–1964)


• History of the Soviet Union (1964–1982)


• History of the People's Republic of China


• Sino-Albanian split


• Sino-American relations


• Sino-Soviet relations


• Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship


• Soviet imperialism

Footnotes

1. 
   ^ ^abc Chambers Dictionary of World History, B.P. Lenman, T. Anderson editors, Chambers: Edinburgh:2000. p. 769.
   


2. 
   ^ Robert A. Scalapino, "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa", Foreign Affairs (1964) 42#4, pp. 640–654. in JSTOR Archived 9 October 2018 at the Wayback Machine
   


3. 
   ^ Scalapino, Robert A. (1964). "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa". Foreign Affairs. 42 (4): 640–654. doi:10.2307/20029719. JSTOR 20029719..mw-parser-output cite.citation{font-style:inherit}.mw-parser-output .citation q{quotes:"""""""'""'"}.mw-parser-output .citation .cs1-lock-free a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/65/Lock-green.svg/9px-Lock-green.svg.png")no-repeat;background-position:right .1em center}.mw-parser-output .citation .cs1-lock-limited a,.mw-parser-output .citation .cs1-lock-registration a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d6/Lock-gray-alt-2.svg/9px-Lock-gray-alt-2.svg.png")no-repeat;background-position:right .1em center}.mw-parser-output .citation .cs1-lock-subscription a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/aa/Lock-red-alt-2.svg/9px-Lock-red-alt-2.svg.png")no-repeat;background-position:right .1em center}.mw-parser-output .cs1-subscription,.mw-parser-output .cs1-registration{color:#555}.mw-parser-output .cs1-subscription span,.mw-parser-output .cs1-registration span{border-bottom:1px dotted;cursor:help}.mw-parser-output .cs1-ws-icon a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svg/12px-Wikisource-logo.svg.png")no-repeat;background-position:right .1em center}.mw-parser-output code.cs1-code{color:inherit;background:inherit;border:inherit;padding:inherit}.mw-parser-output .cs1-hidden-error{display:none;font-size:100%}.mw-parser-output .cs1-visible-error{font-size:100%}.mw-parser-output .cs1-maint{display:none;color:#33aa33;margin-left:0.3em}.mw-parser-output .cs1-subscription,.mw-parser-output .cs1-registration,.mw-parser-output .cs1-format{font-size:95%}.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-left,.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-wl-left{padding-left:0.2em}.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-right,.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-wl-right{padding-right:0.2em}
   


4. 
   ^ Rothbard, Murray N. "The Myth of Monolithic Communism", Libertarian Review, Vol. 8., No. 1 (February 1979), p. 32.
   


5. 
   ^ The historian Lorenz M. Lüthi said: The Sino-Soviet split was one of the key events of the Cold War, equal in importance to the construction of the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Second Vietnam War, and Sino-American Rapprochement. The split helped to determine the framework of the second half of the Cold War in general, and influenced the course of the Second Vietnam War, in particular. Like a nasty divorce, it left bad memories and produced myths of innocence on both sides.Lorenz M. Lüthi (2010). The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. Princeton UP. p. 1. ISBN 9781400837625.
   


6. 
   ^ Zubok, Vladislav and Pleshakov, Constantine. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrsuchchev (1996) p. 56.
   


7. 
   ^ Dictionary of Wars, Third Edition (2007), George Childs Kohn, Ed., p. 121.
   


8. 
   ^ 杨奎松《读史求实》：苏联给了林彪东北野战军多少现代武器 Archived 26 September 2013 at the Wayback Machine
   


9. 
   ^ Dictionary of Wars, Third Edition (2007), George Childs Kohn, Ed., pp. 121–122.
   


10. 
    ^ The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, Third Edition (1999) Allan Bullock and Stephen Trombley, Eds., p. 501.
    


11. 
    ^ Brian Crozier, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire (1999) pp. 142–157.
    


12. 
    ^ Yuri Peskov, "Sixty Years of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the U.S.S.R. and the PRC, February 14, 1950." Far Eastern Affairs (2010) 38#1 pp 100–115.
    


13. 
    ^ Zhihua Shen, and Yafeng Xia. "The great leap forward, the people's commune and the Sino-Soviet split." Journal of contemporary China 20.72 (2011): pp. 861–880.
    


14. 
    ^ Luthi, Lorenz (2008). "Historical Background, 1921–1955". The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. pp. 39–40. ISBN 9780691135908.
    


15. 
    ^ Shabad, Theodore (December 1955). "Communist China's 5 Year Plan". Far Eastern Survey. 24 (12): 189–191. doi:10.2307/3023788. JSTOR 3023788.
    


16. 
    ^ Lüthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (2008), "The Collapse of Socialist Unity, 1956–57", pp. 49–50.
    


17. 
    ^ Lüthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (2008), "The Collapse of Socialist Unity, 1956–57", pp. 62–63.
    


18. 
    ^ Lüthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (2008), "The Collapse of Socialist Unity, 1956–57", p. 48.
    


19. 
    ^ Lüthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (2008) pp. 49–50. "The Collapse of Socialist Unity, 1956–57", pp. 71–73.
    


20. 
    ^ Lüthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (2008), "The Collapse of Socialist Unity, 1956–57", pp. 76–77.
    


21. 
    ^ Lüthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (2008) pp. 91–92., "Mao's Challenges, 1958"
    


22. 
    ^ Lüthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (2008) p. 103. "Mao's Challenges, 1958"
    


23. 
    ^ Sheng, M. (2008). "Mao and China's Relations with the Superpowers in the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino-Soviet Split". Modern China. 4 (34): 499. doi:10.1177/0097700408315991.
    


24. 
    ^ Lüthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (2008), "Mao's Challenges, 1958", p. 80.
    


25. 
    ^ Lüthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (2008), "Mao's Challenges, 1958", pp. 81–83.
    


26. 
    ^ Lüthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (2008), "Mao's Challenges, 1958", pp 80, 103–104.
    


27. 
    ^ David Wolff (7 July 2011). "One Finger's Worth of Historical Events: New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948–1959". Wilson Center. Archived from the original on 7 March 2016. Retrieved 24 February 2016.
    


28. 
    ^ "Chinese Communist Party: The Leaders of the CPSU are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times, February 4, 1964". Modern History Sourcebook. Fordham University. Archived from the original on 31 December 2015. Retrieved 1 July 2015.
    


29. 
    ^ Mark, Chi-kwan (2012). "Ideological Radicalization and the Sino-Soviet split, 1956–64". China and the World since 1945 — An international History, Routledge, p. 49.
    


30. 
    ^ Allen Axelrod, The Real History of the Cold War: A New Look at the Past, p. 213.
    


31. 
    ^ [Bao] Sansan and Bette Bao Lord (1964/1966), Eighth Moon: The True Story of a Young Girl's Life in Communist China, New York: Scholastic, p. 123.
    


32. 
    ^ Mark, Chi-kwan. (2012). "Ideological Radicalization and the Sino-Soviet split", pp. 49–50.
    


33. 
    ^ One-Third of the Earth Archived 4 February 2011 at the Wayback Machine, Time, 27 October 1961
    


34. 
    ^ Richard R. Wertz. "Exploring Chinese History: Politics: International Relations: Sino- Soviet Relations". ibiblio.org. Archived from the original on 7 April 2016. Retrieved 15 April 2016.
    


35. 
    ^ Mark, Chi-Kwan (2012). "Ideological Radicalization and the Sino-Soviet split", pp. 53–55.
    


36. 
    ^ Mark, Chi-Kwan (2012). "Ideological Radicalization and the Sino-Soviet split", pp. 53–55.
    


37. 
    ^ "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement". marxists.org. Archived from the original on 31 January 2016. Retrieved 24 February 2016.
    


38. 
    ^ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 25 December 2007. Retrieved 2007-10-21.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link) CS1 maint: BOT: original-url status unknown (link)
    


39. 
    ^ "At the Summit: Cautious Optimism". The Free Lance-Star. Fredericksburg, Virginia. Associated Press. 24 June 1967. p. 1. Archived from the original on 27 April 2016. Retrieved 17 July 2013.
    


40. 
    ^ Dictionary of Wars, Third Edition (2007), George Childs Kohn, Ed., pp. 122–223.
    


41. 
    ^ The Columbia Encyclopedia, Fifth Edition. Columbia University Press:1993. p. 696.
    


42. 
    ^ Dictionary of Historical Terms, Second Edition, Chris Cook, Ed. Peter Bedrick Books: New York:1999, p. 89.
    


43. 
    ^ The Red Flag: A History of Communism (2009) p. 461.
    


44. 
    ^ Dictionary of Historical Terms, Second Edition, Chris Cook, Ed. Peter Bedrick Books: New York:1999, p. 218.
    


45. 
    ^ Burr, W.; Richelson, J. T. (2000–2001). "Whether to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64". International Security. 25 (3): 54–99. JSTOR 2626706.
    


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    ^ Osborn, Andrew, and Foster, Peter. "USSR planned nuclear attack on China in 1969" Archived 18 March 2018 at the Wayback Machine, Telegraph, 13 May 2010
    


47. 
    ^ ^ab Stephan, John J. The Russian Far East: A History, Stanford University Press:1996.
    ISBN 0-8047-2701-5 Partial text on Google Books. pp. 18–19, 51.
    


48. 
    ^ Connolly, Violet Siberia Today and Tomorrow: A Study of Economic Resources, Problems, and Achievements, Collins:1975. Snippet view only on Google Books.
    


49. 
    ^ Georgy Permyakov (Георгий ПЕРМЯКОВ) The Ancient Tortoise and the Soviet Cement («Черепаха древняя, цемент советский»^{[permanent dead link]}), Tikhookeanskaya Zvezda, 30 April 2000
    


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    ^ Friedman, Jeremy. "Soviet Policy in the Developing World and the Chinese Challenge in the 1960s", Cold War History (2010) 10, No. 2, pp. 247–272.
    


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    ^ Michael D. Gambone (2001). Capturing the Revolution: The United States, Central America, and Nicaragua, 1961–1972. Greenwood. p. 129. ISBN 9780275973056.
    


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    ^ Alaba Ogunsanwo (1974). China's Policy in Africa 1958–71. Cambridge UP. p. 96. ISBN 9780521201261.
    


53. 
    ^ Gregg A. Brazinsky (2017). Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War. University of North Carolina Press. p. 252. ISBN 9781469631714.
    


54. 
    ^ ^ab The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, Third Edition, Allan Bullock, Stephen Trombley editors. Harper Collins Publishers:London:1999. pp. 349–350.
    


55. 
    ^ ^ab Dictionary of Political Terms, Chris Cook, editor. Peter Bedrick Books: New York: 1983. pp. 127–128.
    


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    ^ S. Frederick Starriditor=S. Frederick Starr (2004). Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland (illustrated ed.). M.E. Sharpe. p. 157. ISBN 9780765613189. Retrieved May 22, 2012.
    


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    ^ S. Frederick Starriditor=S. Frederick Starr (2004). Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland (illustrated ed.). M.E. Sharpe. p. 158. ISBN 9780765613189. Retrieved May 22, 2012.
    

Further reading

• Chang, Jung, and Jon Halliday. Mao: The Unknown Story. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005.


• Ellison, Herbert J., ed. The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective (1982) online
  


• Floyd, David. Mao against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict (1964) online
  


• Ford, Harold P., "Calling the Sino-Soviet Split " Calling the Sino-Soviet Split", Studies in Intelligence, Winter 1998-99.


• Friedman, Jeremy. "Soviet policy in the developing world and the Chinese challenge in the 1960s." Cold War History (2010) 10#2 pp. 247–272.


• Friedman, Jeremy. Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World (UNC Press Books, 2015).


• Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally" (Cambridge UP, 2005)


• Heinzig, Dieter. The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945–1950: An Arduous Road to the Alliance ( M. E. Sharpe, 2004).


• Jian, Chen. Mao's China & the Cold War. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001.


• Kochavi, Noam. "The Sino-Soviet Split." in A Companion to John F. Kennedy (2014) pp. 366–383.


• Li, Hua-Yu et al., eds China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present (The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series) (2011) excerpt and text search
  


• 
  Lüthi, Lorenz M. (2010). The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. Princeton UP. ISBN 9781400837625.
  


• Mark, Chi-Kwan. China and the world since 1945: an international history (Routledge, 2011)


• Olsen, Mari. Soviet-Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949–64: Changing Alliances (Routledge, 2007)


• Ross, Robert S., ed. China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War (1993) online
  


• 
  Scalapino, Robert A (1964). "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa". Foreign Affairs. 42 (4): 640–654. doi:10.2307/20029719. JSTOR 20029719.
  


• Westad, Odd Arne, ed. Brothers in arms: the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance, 1945–1963 (Stanford UP. 1998)

Primary sources

• 
  Luthi, Lorenz M. (2008). "Twenty-Four Soviet-Bloc Documents on Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1964–1966". Cold War International History Project Bulletin. 16: 367–398.
  


• [Bao] Sansan and Bette Bao Lord (1964/1966), Eighth Moon: The True Story of a Young Girl's Life in Communist China, reprint, New York: Scholastic, Ch. 9, pp. 120–124. [summary of lectures to cadres on Sino-Soviet split].


• Prozumenshchikov, Mikhail Yu. "The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives." Cold War International History Project Bulletin (1996) 8#9 pp. 1996–1997. online
  

External links

• The CWIHP Document Collection on the Sino-Soviet Split


• 
  The Great Debate: Documents of the Sino-Soviet Split at Marxists Internet Archive

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Documents	Bombard the Headquarters Quotations from Chairman Mao Hai Rui Dismissed from Office
Concepts	Four Olds Struggle session Feudal fascism Big-character poster Cow demons and snake spirits One Divides Into Two Democracy Wall Eight model plays Capitalist roader Learn from Daqing in industry Learn from Dazhai in agriculture Scar literature
Groups	Red Guards May Sixteenth elements Five Man Group Cultural Revolution Group Central Case Examination Group Central Organization and Propaganda Leading Group Revolutionary committee Shanghai People's Commune 8341 Special Regiment Sent-down youth 61 Renegades Barefoot doctor Stinking Old Ninth Five Black Categories Five Red Categories Worker-Peasant-Soldier student May Seventh Cadre School
Related topics	Maoism Great Leap Forward Class struggle Sino-Soviet split Ultra-Leftism Peaceful Evolution theory Two Whatevers
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Authority control	GND: 4147694-3 NDL: 00573941

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